We run a modified dictator game experiment to investigate the determinants of donation choices to nine top philanthropic organizations. We find experimentally that the adoption of a simple form of accountability such as the disclosure of information on the ranking of aggregate contributions received by organizations has important redistributive effects on donations, leading donors to reallocate significantly their giving from top to bottom performers. Our findings support the hypothesis that individuals have preferences on total donations and their "ideal" distribution and not just on their own giving. Policy consequences of our findings in terms of contribution disclosure rules are discussed.
Introduction
In 2009 in the United States charitable giving totalled $303.75 billion. Annual individual giving generally exceeds 2% of GDP, with 90% of people giving money to at least one charity (Giving USA 2010) . In other high-income countries philanthropy is also widespread (Andreoni 2001 and 2006) . In Europe, for instance, 53 percent of the population give money to charities (73 percent in UK, 62 in Italy, 31 in France) while 23 percent provide voluntary work to non-profit organizations (29 percent in UK, 16 in Italy, 22 in France). 1 It is therefore not surprising that such a relevant economic phenomenon attracted the interest of many economists. The vast economic literature on charitable giving has focused its analysis on three main domains: the definition of pro-social and altruistic components of individual preferences (Andreoni, 1989 and 1990; Harbaugh, 1998; Goeree et al., 2002; Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002; see also Camerer, 2003 , for a comprehensive review), the role of monetary and non-monetary incentives on giving (Morgan, 2000; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Rege and Telle, 2004) and the interaction of motives and incentives in terms of complementarity or substitutability (Schiff, 1985; Bergstrom et al., 1986; Andreoni, 1988; Steinberg, 1990; Randolph, 1995; Auten et al., 2002) . However, in this large and steadily growing body of research there is no empirical evidence, to our knowledge, on the effects of organizational accountability on individual donations. This is actually a very relevant direction of research which may help to understand the role of an important factor in donors' decisions when they allocate their giving among different organizations.
In this paper we focus on a very basic form of accountability, namely, the public availability of information on aggregate private donations received by the organization. The effects of this kind of information on the level of donations and on its distribution are not clear. On the one hand, top-ranking organizations may be able to attract more donations if the total amount received is interpreted as a signal of worthiness of the cause supported by the organization by a potential new donor. On the other hand, donors may prefer a pluralism of well-funded organizations and may be negatively surprised if organizations which they deem important receive much less funds than they expect. In the first case, information would increase the 1 See Charities Aid Foundation's The World Giving Index 2010 (www.cafonline.org) donations towards the top of the ranking, in the second case, we would observe some form of redistribution from the top to the bottom of the ranking.
Based on these considerations we sketch a simple theoretical model "impure" altruism with some variants and test its behavioral implications in a laboratory experiment in which participants decide how to allocate a sum of money to their preferred charitable organizations.
The subjects play a modified version of the dictator game in which they can choose both the amount to send and the recipient's identity. The recipient is chosen among nine top organizations working in different domains (environment, health, peace-keeping, human rights, blood donation, medical research). In the control group the decision is blind (no information is provided apart from names and field of activity). In the treatment group participants are provided with additional information about total donations received by each of the nine organizations in the previous fiscal year prior to making their choice.
We find that this information has significant redistributive effects on donations, since it leads participants to reallocate some money from top to bottom performers. We interpret our findings as evidence that individuals have preferences not only on their own but also on other people giving and, as a consequence, that individual giving creates externalities affecting other donors' preferences. We also remark that the redistributive effect is compatible with the hypothesis that individual donors have also preferences on the distribution of giving and, more specifically, some form of inequity aversion in charitable giving, that is, aversion toward contribution shares which are beyond the (lower and upper) boundaries of the region of shares which they deem fair.
Our findings are potentially rich in terms of normative consequences even though the latter need to be drawn with caution. If we agree with conclusions of Benz and Meier (2008) and Falk et al. (2010) , on the correlation between lab and field experiments when people donate, that is, if people tend to behave in a similar way when money is distributed (in the lab) as well as when it is earned (in the the field), public disclosure of aggregate donations may have important redistributive effects and organizations that get less should not be ashamed to say it since this could represent a comparative advantage that may increase giving toward them. The fact that their comparative advertising may however create negative externalities on top performing organizations deserves further reflection on whether such comparative advertising (especially, as in our experiment, the one in which the focus is restricted on aggregate contributions of just a few organizations) should be allowed.
Based on what is mentioned above the rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2
we present a theoretical model formulating hypotheses on "purely" or "impurely" altruistic preferences that will be tested in the empirical analysis. In section 3 we describe the experimental design. In section 4 we present descriptive findings, balancing properties of the two treatments, nonparametric tests and econometric analysis with robustness checks. In section 5 we discuss implications of our findings. Section 6 concludes.
Impurely altruistic preferences: the theoretical framework
Consider the i-th "fully impure" altruistic 2 participant to our experiment who cares only about her own donating action. Her utility function is
where Z is the monetary sum available for consumption goods and G ij is her donation to the jth organization. The impure altruist maximizes the following
where M is the value of the endowment given by the experimenter in equal amount to all participants and λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the constrained maximisation. Note that M=αΩ where Ω is the endowment in ECUs (experiment currency units) and α the conversion factor which turns one ECU into one euro.
First order conditions are
since ∆G=-∆Z. Hence, the i-th individual will equalize at optimum the marginal utility of donating to each organization with the marginal disutility of subtracting one monetary unit to consumption. As a consequence marginal utilities of donating to each of the nine 2 As it is clear from (1) we denote as "fully impure" altruist a subject who cares for one's own donating action only, with no regard for the total amount received by the organization. The implicit assumption is that, if an individual is purely altruistic and considers the activity of the organization worthwhile, she should care about the total amount received by that organization vis à vis the other organizations and how her own donating choice may affect it. Note that this specification is a special case of the "impure altruism" hypothesis in the Andreoni (1990) benchmark when we extend it to multiple donating options. In Andreoni (1990) utility depends on one's own gift (the impure component) and on the total amount of public good. If we remove the second argument and we increase the number of donors' opportunities we have our case.
organizations should be equal at optimum. The availability of public information on aggregate donations does not change her choice. Consider now the following variation of (1)
where the last argument of the utility function enters with negative sign, G j is the total giving received by the j-th organization, γ j is the share of aggregate donations received by the j-th organization and γ j * (i) the share corresponding to i-th player optimal allocation of resources among the nine organizations. In essence, with (2) we assume that the individual experiences a disutility in observing aggregate shares that are different from her preferred allocation.
First order conditions turn into
Consider that the individual does not know γ j but formulates an expectation on it by observing past aggregate contributions collected by the M organizations. Hence E[γ jt ]= γ j,t-1 with γ jt =γ j for notational simplicity. The difference in this first order condition is that an additional unit donated to a given organization has now two effects. The first is the 'warm-glow' effect from donating, the second is the change in the share obtained by the organization that has positive (negative) effect on player's utility if the aggregate share received by that organization is below (above) the optimal one for the donor.
To sum up preferences in (2) (but not in (1)) imply rejection of the null of no difference between a situation in which the individual has or has not information on aggregate contributions received by the j-th organization and are consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure of information about aggregate contributions generates significant effects.
However, a variant of (2) may be a case in which players experience a disutility if an organization gets less (more) than a lower (upper) bound share which delimits the region of shares that they consider to be compatible with fairness or equitability. 3 More formally, this implies that
First order conditions turn into 
The Experiment
In what follows we shortly describe the experimental design, our hypotheses and the procedure adopted in the experiment.
Experimental Design and Hypotheses.
The experiment is designed to reveal the effect of information disclosure on donations' aggregate level and distribution having as a reference the alternative theoretical assumptions on purely and impurely altruistic preferences illustrated in (1), (2) and (2'). We consider a one-shot version of a modified dictator game in which the dictator has to choose both the share of her endowment (100 experimental currency units) she wants to give and the recipient's identity. A unique recipient can be chosen from a set of nine well-known nonprofit organizations. To assess the effect of information on aggregate donations on giving decisions, we consider a between-subject design in which we compare subjects' choices under two different treatments:
the 'no-information treatment' (NIT) and the 'with information treatment' (WIT). The two conditions differ only with respect to the information about the total donations received by the nine organizations in the previous fiscal year that are made available to the subjects in the WIT but not in the NIT. Our goal is to investigate whether the information on the total amount of funds raised by each organization in the previous year leads to a modification in 4 Emergency is an independent NGO, founded in Italy in 1994. Its goal is to provide high quality and free of charge health care to the war and poverty victims. home_page/00000004_Home_Page.html). WWF is the world's largest and most experienced indipendent conservation organization, which addresses issues from the survival of species and habitats to climate change, sustainable business and environmental education (http://www.wwf.org/). Amnesty International is a global movement with more than 3 million supporters, members and activists in more than 150 countries and territories. Its goal is to campaign against grave human rights abuses (http://www.amnesty.org/). the distribution of donations among the different organizations.
If we denote with G j (NIT) the total amount of donations received by the j-th organization in the NIT and with G j(WIT) the amount received in the WIT, our first hypothesis 5 can be described
We sketch our null in this way since we argue that violation of equality between NIT and WIT contributions for only one organization implies the rejection of the hypothesis of fully impure altruistic preferences in the sense postulated by (1). Note as well that an individual can have fully impure altruistic preferences and the null not be rejected in the special case in which the observed shares of donations of different organizations are consistent with the desired ones. Hence, while rejection of the null for just one organization is sufficient to reject the fully impure altruism postulated by (1), non rejection of the null is not a sufficient condition to accept the validity of the impure altruism from (1).
Besides the donation choices we gather information on socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of participants through a World Values Survey-type questionnaire. We finally measure subjects' Empathy Quotient (EQ) and their guilt-propensity through two psychometric tests, the Cambridge Empathy Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004) and the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) (Tangney et al. 1989 ). 
Procedures.
Data refers to a total of 230 subjects recruited via posters and e-mails, among first-year economics students at University of Cagliari, where the experiment was conducted in February 2011. At their arrival in the lab each subject received an ID card with a random number and a booklet containing the instructions, the experimental task and the questionnaires. Participants were invited to write the ID number in the booklet and keep the card. Instructions were read aloud and questions about the procedure and the payment rules were answered privately. Each subject was presented with the dictator game and a list of nine organizations among which to pick their recipient organization. Within each of the two (WIT and NIT) treatments half of the subjects completed the WVS-type questionnaire before the choice task and half after the task. In the final part of the session the subjects completed the 5 6 The general questionnaire as well as those used to measure empathy and guilt propensity are in Appendix.
Cambridge Empathy Quotient Questionnaire (EQ) and the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA). A final question, to check the saliency of the incentives, asked if the subject was willing to be contacted in case of future experiments. 7 At this point the booklets were collected and the individual earning calculated. Money was put in an envelope with the ID number of the corresponding player and distributed the day after the experiment, by members of the administrative staff to comply with the double blind procedure. The sessions lasted approximately 1 hour. No show-up fee was paid. The average reward was 3.10 euros (with an exchange rate Euro/ECU equal to 0.10). The total amount given to each organization was actually donated to the corresponding organization by the experimenters and the receipts were made available on the research group website 8 .
Empirical findings
In what follows we present and discuss our empirical findings looking at descriptive evidence (section 4.1), satisfaction of balancing properties between treatment and control groups, nonparametric tests (section 4.2) and econometric evidence (section 4.3) on our experimental hypothesis.
Descriptive findings
A first element we are interested in is the descriptive statistics of the relevant variables of our inquiry. We observe that 42 percent of participants are males and the average number of members of their household is 4.2 (Table 2 ). Plain donation scores of the nine organizations in the two experimental treatments (WIT and NIT), with their relative change in performance when information is introduced, are provided in Table 2 , while the comparison among official shares and those in the treatment and control sample is in Figure 1 . By observing our data a first interesting finding is, in our opinion, the strong distance between AIRC (research against 7 Around 94 percent of subjects participating in the experiment answer positively. The dummy taking value of one in case of positive answer does not affect econometric findings which follow. Results including it among regressors are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request. 8 http://people.unica.it/berg/ cancer) and all other destinations. The former gets on average around 35 ECU from each participant, seven times more than the second ranked destination (Emergency). 9 The other relevant descriptive result, more directly related to our experiment, is the change in organization shares after information on donation rankings is revealed.
On this point note that ADMO and AVIS (respectively the bone marrow and blood donation organisations) received only 0.02 and 0.01 percent (2 and 1 Euros over 10,000) of total contributions according to official aggregate contributions (much less than what they get by experiment participants in the NIT case, that is, around 10 and 5 percent respectively), while
Emergency had the lion's share with around 49 percent of aggregate contributions (much more than the share obtained by NIT players which is around 11 percent).
Findings from our experiment seem to show that participants react significantly to this information. The two organizations which are by far at the bottom (ADMO and AVIS) receive in the WIT almost twice as much, while Emergency sees its contributions more than halved (from around 6.70 to around 3.14 ECUs per player). The third lowest receiver under official contributions (Caritas) -which has nonetheless a much higher share than ADMO and AVIS (around 1 percent) -sees, consistent with our redistribution hypothesis, a moderate increase in average contribution from the NIT to the WIT. Beyond redistributive effects, it is also worth mentioning the (positive) change for WWF which moves from around 1.3 to 4.2 ECUs.
Finally, note that, on aggregate, donations are slightly higher under the WIT than under the NIT case (around 4 ECUs more).
Since players can choose to donate to one organisation only changes in contribution shares mirror changes in the number of donors. More specifically, by considering the two organizations with lowest aggregate official contributions, donors to AVIS move from 5 to 11 and those to Admo from 10 to 20 when players are informed about official contributions received by the organizations. By considering organizations with highest aggregate official contributions, donors to AIRC fall from 67 to 59 and those to Emergency from 12 to 5.
If we interpret our findings in terms of preferences in (2') we find them consistent with the hypothesis that players may consider that the ADMO and AVIS shares are below and the Emergency share above the region of fair and equitable donating shares. This therefore generates a redistribution effect from the NIT to the WIT. Such effect increases donations for the two organizations below the lower bound (ADMO and AVIS) and reduces those for the organization above the upper bound (Emergency). The same reasoning may apply to Caritas (if we also consider it below the lower bound), even though the effect seems smaller. In the sections that follow we will see whether our descriptive findings are robust to non-parametric and econometric testing.
Non-parametric tests
Since we are adopting a between-subject design (different individuals participate to different treatments) we are first and foremost interested in verifying whether balancing properties are met. We find that this is the case for the control factors measured by our questionnaire and used in the empirical analysis that follows. In no case do we find significant differences in means for the 23 considered variables between the two groups even considering an 8 percent significance threshold (see Table 3 ). Since it may be a limit to look just at one element of the distribution we also perform the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the equality of distributions and find again that the null of no difference is not rejected for all the considered variables.
After checking for the randomness of selection into treatment we test with non-parametric rank tests our null hypothesis that donations are unchanged between the WIT and the NIT.
The null hypothesis is not rejected at 10 percent for ADMO (p-value 0.054), at 5 percent for WWF (p-value 0.024), while it is not rejected for AVIS (p-value 0.101). P-values are much higher in all the other cases (Table 4) . 10 Note that, if we sum donations for the two organizations which are at the bottom of official donations according to the WIT information sheet (ADMO and AVIS), the null of no 10 Note that, since players in our experiment may choose only one organization, they may not be able to reach the constrained optimum which maximizes preferences in (1), (2) 
Econometric findings
Even though non-parametric tests are considered benchmark findings in economic experiments when balancing properties between treatment and control samples are met, we nonetheless deem important to run regressions for several reasons. First, we can control for the impact of observable confounding factors affecting players' decisions. Second, we can correct for fixed effects related to the specific experiment session by variance clustering.
Third, we may evaluate the magnitude and significance of the differences in donations between the WIT and the NIT, net of such controls. Fourth, we may take into account the correlated nature of donating decisions to each organization by means of estimating a simultaneous equation system and, fifth, we may take into account the specific nature of our dependent variable which has lower and upper bounds.
11 Note that significance vanishes if we add the fourth worst performer (p-value .18).
Given our set of observables we start our econometric analysis by estimating the following model separately for each j-th organisation
where G ij is the amount that the i-th player donates to the j-th organization (j=1,…,9), WIT is a dummy taking value of one in the WIT in which players may have access to information about performance and ranking of the nine organizations in terms of aggregate donations before making their choice. The k X-controls in the baseline estimate include a male gender dummy, respondent's weekly income, the number of household members, the number of friends on Facebook, a dummy taking value one (zero) if the questionnaire has been administered before (after) the experiment and a measure of political preferences on a discrete multinomial left-right axis. Note that all participants attend the same undergraduate year and have the same age by experimental design so that we do not include these two variables among controls. Variance in all specifications is clustered at session level.
The choice of the estimation method depends on our assumption on the distribution of our dependent variable. The individual donation has clearly an upper bound (individuals cannot donate more than their endowment of 100 ECUs even if they would) and a lower bound in the zero value as well if we admit the possibility of negative donations (individuals might in principle desire to subtract money to some organizations in order to give more to others).
Hence, the observed distribution of donations to a given organization is actually a distorted proxy of the actual unbounded distribution. This is why we must use a Tobit model for our estimate. The choice between a model with just an upper bound or also a lower bound depends on whether we think that the possibility of negative donations would make a difference or, alternatively, if we assume that the zero choices are true zero choices which would not turn into negative choices in case the possibility would be allowed. 12 We propose estimates that consider both options.
Upper bound tobit estimates shown in Table 5 document that the WIT dummy is negative and significant for Emergency (p-value <.01), positive for ADMO and negative for AIRC (p-value <.05). It is not significant for the other five organizations.
12 Note that the problem of hitting lower and upper bounds does not apply when we consider as dependent variable the rebalance index or sum of donation indicators.
Information disclosure is strongly significant on all our hypotheses that combine donations to the organizations whose official shares are at the extremes of the distribution. Two sided bound Tobit estimates yield results in the same direction of one-sided Tobit estimates with stronger significance but also inflated magnitudes (Table 6 ). This might suggest that the assumption that zero donations could have actually been negative donations, would the latter be allowed, is too strong. One-sided bounds are therefore preferred.
Robustness checks
In order to evaluate the robustness of our main findings (significance of the information effect for ADMO, Emergency, the sum of donations to ADMO and AVIS, the rebalance index) we perform a robustness check. More specifically, we verify whether the significance of our findings persists under alternative specifications which include: i) nonlinear specification of income and number of household members; ii) introduction of psychometric measures of empathy and guilt-propensity 13 ; iii) introduction of self-reported measures of time spent in different activities by participants; iv) introduction of variables measuring participants' affiliation to different organizations.
Our findings on the significance of the WIT dummy for donations to individual organisations are quite robust to the introduction of all these variables. Results for ADMO, Emergency, the sum of ADMO and AVIS and the rebalancing index are generally confirmed in the robustness checks (Table 8 ).
14 Finally, consider that donating choices to the nine different organizations are correlated (giving more to one of them reduces what can be given to another). Hence, a proper way to 13 These two factors have often been considered in the psychological literature as determinants of pro-social behavior (see, among others, Leith and Baumeister, 1998; Davis et al., 1999; Hoffman, 2000; Pelligra, 2011) 14 Table 8 reports results only for the main regressors of interest. Full details of the estimates are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.
estimate our model is with an equation system where correlation among residuals of the individual equations is accounted for. We therefore estimate with 3-stage least squares the system composed by nine different equations specified as in (1) in which the dependent variable is the sum that the i-th individual donates to the j-th organisation.
Our findings show that the information dummy remains positive and significant for ADMO and Emergency (even though weakly so in the last case) ( Table 7 , column 7). Consider that in this case we do not take into account upper and lower bounds of our variable. We also estimate a restricted 3SLS model where donations to AVIS, ADMO and Emergency are summed (the rebalance index). In such a case the number of equations of the system drops to seven. The WIT dummy in the rebalance index equation is strongly positive and significant confirming previous findings from non-parametric tests and single equation Tobit estimates.
The same significant result is found in other restricted equation systems for the sum of donations to the two (AVIS and ADMO) and to the three (AVIS, ADMO and Caritas) worst performers.
We also verify the determinants of aggregate donations with an OLS estimate (bounds are not binding here as in donations to individual organisations) and find that the WIT variable is weakly significant with players donating on average around 6 ECUs more in the WIT (Table   8 ). The result is however not robust to the inclusion of additional controls. A variable which is strongly significant in the first specification is the number of household members. Each additional member generates 10 more ECUs in terms of donations in the linear specification.
The quadratic specification is however shown to fit better the data with a strongly positive and significant term in household size and negative and significant squared number of household members. The significance of household members disappears when we introduce the empathy and guilt-propensity indexes which are both positive and significant. To sum up, individuals in large families donate more and this seems to be due to their higher empathy and guilt propensity.
Other interesting results to document are that i) females donate significantly more for AIRCcancer research (the magnitude of the effect is strong and around 16 ECUs); ii) left-wing political orientation increases donations for Emergency 15 and for Amnesty International.
Based on all this evidence we can conclude that the redistributive hypothesis is not rejected by our findings even though the latter does not explain all changes from the WIT to the NIT (and, especially, the WIT effect on WWF). The two organizations (ADMO and AVIS) with markedly lower official aggregate donations have significantly more donations cumulatively in the WIT, while the organization that plays the lion's share in the official donations (Emergency) gets significantly less. The economic significance is relevant since the first two, when taken together, almost double and the third more than halves their contributions. The effect is significant for ADMO and Emergency in individual Tobit estimates, while it is much weaker for AVIS individually taken. When we consider jointly the effect of information disclosure in our experiment (between effect from the NIT to the WIT) on ADMO, AVIS and Emergency organizations by building the rebalance index we find that the latter is strongly significant in non-parametric tests and in all kind of econometric estimates and robustness checks performed. We find evidence of similar robustness in our findings when we consider the sum of donation to AVIS and ADMO only.
External consistency and policy implications
The advantage of our experiment lies in its simplicity and external validity. Since not much money is at stake one might wonder whether observed findings are due to chance. It does not seem so given results of our hypothesis testing and since the redistributive direction of differences in donations between the WIT and NIT case seems clear. Moreover, side findings about household size, empathy, guilt-propensity and female preference for cancer research make sense. Players seem to take seriously their role.
Interesting policy considerations can be drawn from our findings. If actual behavior is consistent with lab behavior, publicly available (and easily comparable) information on aggregate contributions generates redistributive (from top to bottom performers) effects on donations. Individual players have their own preferences but, if they choose having information about preferences of the others, they may coordinate and take into account this additional information for a better choice.
A policy implication of our analysis is that the commonly observed practice to redistribute tax donations of givers who do not specify organization names proportionally to the aggregate amount received by each organization (this is, for instance, the rule of 5 per thousand tax donation in Italy) goes against the observed inequity aversion in charitable giving. Alternative mechanisms containing redistributive effects could be preferred by donors.
A second implication is that bottom ranked organizations should not be ashamed to say publicly that they did not get much or, more precisely, that they can get benefit by advertising their ranking in terms of aggregate donations. However, we saw that such a strategy could generate negative externalities for top ranked organizations. The question is therefore whether regulators should allow such organizations to do comparative advertising. If however the information on rankings is publicly available, it may be difficult for regulators to prevent bottom ranked institutions to make reference to these available rankings in their advertising.
A more targeted issue is whether it should be allowed for the latter to create a restricted focus similar to the one we use in the experiment design, that is, a more straightforward comparative information in which only some organizations are compared with others with a much stronger probability of generating negative externalities on the top ranked organizations which are selected in the restricted information sheet.
Conclusions
The literature on charitable giving has mainly focused its attention on the relationship between giving and monetary and non-monetary incentives. However, a very important and unexplored issue is whether and how donating choices are affected by the publicly available information on aggregate contributions received by different organizations.
We address this issue with a simple experiment where in the treatment group players are informed about aggregate contributions received by organisations in the recent past before choosing how much and to whom they donate.
Our findings document that the null of no change between treatment and control group is rejected. More specifically, players who receive the information increase significantly their donations to the two bottom performers and reduce it significantly to the top performer.
This redistributive effect is not compatible with fully impure altruistic preferences where individuals care only about their own contributions. It is instead compatible with preferences in which aggregate donations are included among arguments of the utility function.
Furthermore, since the two bottom performers have an extremely low share (below 0.03 percent), and the top performer a very high share (around 49 percent) of aggregate donations, our findings are consistent with predictions from a preference structure in which individuals experience a disutility when aggregate donations received by a given organization are outside the boundaries of a region of shares which they may deem fair and equitable. Note that it is not possible with our data to discriminate between these last two hypotheses or, more specifically, about the presence or not of this inequity aversion element, even though we strongly suspect that such an element exists, given the structure of our data and our results.
On the normative side, our results pose a question on whether comparative advertising on aggregate donations (especially restricting the focus on just a few organizations as we did in the experiment) should be allowed since the benefits of increased donations to bottom performers should be traded off with the costs of reduced donations to top performers.
Furthermore, the inequity aversion in charitable giving we document in our paper suggests that some redistributive mechanisms might fit better with donors preferences with respect to the commonly observed proportional redistribution (based on the aggregate donations received) of tax donations from givers who do not specify any organization. The table presents coefficient and robust standard errors of the WIT variable in row for the following on sided Tobit specifications: (1) baseline + guilt propensity and empathy; (2) baseline plus quadratic household size, income and number of Facebook friends; (3) baseline + affiliation dummies; (4) baseline + time allocation dummies; (5) baseline + affiliation and time allocation dummies; (6) 3 stage least square results with findings organized as follows: i) coefficients in the last three rows (9 equation system with baseline for each of the nine organizations); ii) coefficient in the first row (8 equation system where the two baseline equations for Avis and Admo are replaced by a unique equation where the dependent variable is the sum of donations to Avis and Admo); iii) coefficient in the second row (7 equation system where the two baseline equations for Avis, Admo and Caritas are replaced by a unique equation where the dependent variable is the sum of donations to Avis, Admo and Caritas) iv) coefficient in the third row (7 equation system where the three baseline equations for Avis, Admo and Emergency are replaced by a unique equation where the dependent variable is the sum of donations to Avis and Admo minus donations to Emergency (rebalance index)). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? (Code one answer):
Most people can be trusted Need to be very careful.
11.
For each of the following organizations, could you tell how much confidence you have in them: (Read out and code one answer for each):
Trust
No Trust I don't know The press
The radio The European Union
The United Nations
The Regional Parliament
The Regional Government
The Provincial Government
The Local government
The National Health Service
Charitable or humanitarian organizations
The Public School
The Banks
The Bankers
The Financial Market 
